Cycle 67-69
Interzonal
The first Interzonal outside of Europe will stay in the annals of the chess history by virtue of Fischer’s treble appearance at and departure from the tournament. The crisis arose when Fischer and Reshevsky announce that they will not play on Shabbat for religious holydays and Fisher to refuse to play four games in a row without a free day. Fischer twice left and returned to the tournament but when the Arbiter decided that Fisher should lose by default the games were he was absent, he finally left the tournament for good. Larsen’s victory was impressive but we should say that when Fischer left the tournament he was leading with 8.5/11. For the Danish GM this tournament was the start of a long series of success. With him qualified also Gligoric, the only one undefeated, Korchnoi, Geller, Portisch and the American veteran Reshevsky after a tie-break match with Hort and Stein.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | Total | ||
| 1 | Larsen,B | xx | 0 | = | = | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | = | 0 | 1 | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15.5 |
| 2 | Korchnoi,V | 1 | Xx | = | = | 1 | = | = | = | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | 14.0 |
| 3 | Geller,E | = | = | Xx | = | = | 0 | 1 | = | 1 | = | = | 1 | = | = | 1 | = | = | 1 | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.0 |
| 4 | Gligoric,S | = | = | = | xx | = | = | = | 1 | = | = | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.0 |
| 5 | Portisch,L | 1 | 0 | = | = | xx | = | = | 1 | 0 | = | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | = | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13.5 |
| 6 | Reshevsky,S | 0 | = | 1 | = | = | xx | = | = | 1 | = | = | 1 | = | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | = | 13.0 |
| 7 | Hort,V | 0 | = | 0 | = | = | = | xx | 1 | = | = | 1 | = | = | = | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13.0 |
| 8 | Stein,L | 0 | = | = | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | Xx | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | = | 13.0 |
| 9 | Matulovic,M | 0 | 1 | 0 | = | 1 | 0 | = | = | xx | 0 | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | 0 | = | = | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | 1 | 12.5 |
| 10 | Matanovic,A | = | = | = | = | = | = | = | = | 1 | xx | = | 1 | = | = | = | = | 1 | = | 0 | 1 | = | = | 12.0 |
| 11 | Ivkov,B | 0 | 1 | = | = | = | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | xx | 0 | = | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 11.0 |
| 12 | Mecking,H | 0 | 1 | 0 | = | = | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Xx | 1 | 1 | 1 | = | = | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | 11.0 |
| 13 | Gipslis,A | 0 | = | = | = | = | = | = | 0 | = | = | = | 0 | Xx | = | 0 | 1 | = | 0 | 1 | = | 1 | 1 | 10.0 |
| 14 | Kavalek,L | = | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | = | = | = | 0 | = | = | 0 | = | Xx | = | 1 | = | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10.0 |
| 15 | Suttles,D | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | = | 0 | 1 | = | 0 | 0 | 1 | = | xx | = | 1 | 0 | = | 1 | = | 1 | 9.5 |
| 16 | Bilek,I | 0 | 0 | = | = | = | = | = | 0 | = | = | = | = | 0 | 0 | = | xx | = | = | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9.0 |
| 17 | Barczay,L | = | 0 | = | = | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | = | = | = | 0 | = | xx | = | 1 | = | = | 1 | 8.0 |
| 18 | Byrne,R | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | = | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | = | = | 1 | 0 | 1 | = | = | xx | 1 | = | = | 0 | 7.5 |
| 19 | Cuellar Gacharna | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | = | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | = | 0 | 0 | 0 | xx | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6.5 |
| 20 | Miagmasuren,L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | 1 | = | = | 0 | 0 | 1 | = | = | 1 | Xx | 0 | 1 | 6.5 |
| 21 | Sarapu,O | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | = | = | 0 | 1 | xx | = | 4.0 |
| 22 | Bouaziz,S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | = | Xx | 3.5 |
| Fischer,R | – | = | – | – | = | 1 | – | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | = | – | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | – | 8.5 |
Grandmaster Trufinovic from Yugoslavia reported for the Chess Review. “Until the very beginning of the tournament, no one knew surely if Fischer was going to participate. But sonic prior events indicated that the American Champion was seriously preparing for that competition. For the first time in five years, he appeared again in tournaments in Europe: at Monte Carlo and at Skopje; and ‘he won both events. Having finished the tournament at Skopje, the remained in Yugoslavia, and that he did not immediately return home was an obvious indication that he was going to play in the interzonal. So, finally, Fischer had decided firmly to strive for the chess crown by the direct route through the FIDE tournaments.
At Sousse, Fischer appeared more nervous than previously. He snubbed the spectators, could not seem to find a comfortable position for his chair and entered into open warfare with photographers, allowing them to take no pictures of him. But nothing affected his play: l started extremely well; in fact, his play could hardly have been better.
At the very start, he won successively from Myagmarsuren of Mongolia and Barczay of Hungary. In the third round, be had a very sharp encounter with Portisch of Hungary, one of the favorites in the tournament, but this game ended in a draw. There followed a victory against Sarapu of New Zealand, a draw with Kavalek of Czechoslovakia -and another win against Cuellar of Colombia. In the seventh round, Fischer met Stein, three times Champion of the Soviet Union and one of the greatest favorites in tie tournament. And he came off with fIying colors, at the same time taking the lead in the tournament. This game was a sure sign that Fischer does not speak vainly and is able to realize what he promises.
Everything ‘was flowing smoothly and normally, and no one could foresee the complications -and tempestuous develop. the menu which came immediately after.
For Rounds 8 and 9, Fischer-did not appear in the tournament hail. He had three successive free days, all in keeping with the tournament rules as confirmed by the FIDE. For the rules had some special provisions, namely privileges for Reshevsky and Fischer whereby they needed not, for religious reasons, play on Friday at all and on Saturday would start three hours later than the other participants. All that, however, was not enough, for they also had religious holidays that Wednesday and Thursday and late October. These holidays interrupted the normal rhythm of the tournament, but no one dared to make any open protest, and the tournament went right on- What kind of chess would there be if all the participants asked to be allowed to celebrate their national and religious holidays? It would then become impossible to organize a tournament.
Then suddenly came an earthquake, unannounced and totally unexpected. And it came from practically nothing,
Fischer, who had fallen two games behind, saw -that he had to play four games in a row, and all of them with the Soviet grandmasters, this principal rivals in the tournament. So, before he started to play with Gipslis, he had asked the Tournament Committee to grant him one day off so he would not have these, four games all in one burst. The request was not terrible: if the committee could allow such a number of free days for religious holidays, I cannot see why they could not solve this more important and more reasonable problem. –
Of course, I must point-out that Fischer’s claim lost much of its force in that other participants had similar and even more difficult stretches than he had, and they did not dare to appear with such a claim. For example, Korchnoi had to play seven games successively, without time off. But Fischer put his claim as an ultimatum, saying he would leave the tournament if the Committee did not agree to it. It seems as if Fischer didn’t realize that he was dealing with the organization of FIDE and so his demand appears naive and childish. He was as much as saying that he was the most important person and that the tournament was organized solely for him. Fischer is a fastidious champion and had already presented similar demands in other tournaments and always succeeded in getting ‘his way. And, even here in the FIDE tournament rules, there were some provisions which conceded privileges for him and Reshevsky. Well, he had good reason to believe he could carry on so: in effect, he had been brought up that way.
Mere, however, he was not in a position to present such an ultimatum. He could have explained his problem and asked for an alleviation. Who knows what would have happened if he acted like that? This way, though, his demand caused a revolt in the whole tournament. Fischer did not realize that he had there many rivals who envied his success and that they could use his awn weapons against him as happened later.
From this, his first mistake, everything progressed exactly as his rivals wanted. His believes that there is justice and chivalry in chess, especially in chess, and that the main hero should always be the winner as usually happens in novels, and doesn’t in real life- The Committee refused his request and then he answered aimlessly that he was going to leave the tourma.meat and actually did not appear for The game with Gipslis. Then, after one hour had elapsed on his clock, he acquired his first zero, a technical one.
As can he seen, the conflict arose from nothing. An experienced tournament director could ‘have solved that episode and those which came up late; with skillful and good-natured handling. But the group of judges at Sousse did’ not have authority and experience enough.
The patrons of the tournament included President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia and so, understandably, the organizers tried to resolve the conflict. They found Fischer in Tunis and persuaded him to return to the tournament, promising him a free stay and also that they would reconsider the matter of the forfeit to Gipslis. Fischer rebated to Sousse but none of the participants knew. Coming up was his game with Reshevsky who was sitting by the chessboard expecting a “sweet” point against Fischer, without a fight. Reshevsky had relaxed completely expecting it certain that Fischer was not returning. But Fischer had come back and was resting from his trip in bed und observing how many minutes he bad left till the forfeit deadline. When informed that only ten minutes remained he answered, “I still have enough time for Reshevsky!” He appeared in the tournament ball, as we usually put it, at one minute to midnight. Those, present assert that there never was so exciting a scene in a chess tournament before. The appearance of Dracula or even of the dead Alekhine could not have caused greater surprise or excitement. Reshevsky was really shocked so that with an involuntary gesture he knocked the peruke from his head. Stein, who had been sure that his loss to Fischer would erased, beheld his zero returning and darkening, his chance to qualify. The worst calamity occurred to Reshevsky. Though shocked and unprepared, he went on with his game with Fischer, and, quite understandably, committed a grave error after which his resistance was only symbolical. When he had written down his resignation, he stood up shooting: “Please let me have a French translator. I protest. I will not play with Fischer!” The protest came too late: the game was over. After that, Fischer played to a draw with Korchnoi and defeated his compatriot, R. Byrne. Fischer could then regard the further course of the tournament with optimism, regardless of the forfeit.
His qualifying could not be questioned. Moreover, the common opinion was that he could still win the tournament. It is interesting that, during the Fischer Affair, a group of player and second demanded a written apology from Fischer because of his manner. Their aim is unclear as it is not apparent how Fischer offended them. There are some who believe their aim was psychological pressure on Fischer. Happily the unsympathetic action failed from want of sufficient support within the tournament.
The tournament continued normally and yet over it, like a sword of Damocles was hanging the unsettle question of Fischer’s forfeit to Gipslis. Then came the second and decisive error by the organizers and by Fischer, too. Instead of undertaking immediately and energetically to resolve this issue they let it be prolonged. The Tournament Committee apparently expected the decision and relief from it to fall from the sky by itself and Fischer, on his part, waited for their solution until, as the second half of the tournament approached, he had to consider that, if he left the tournament, he would be scored zeros for each of the remaining games. Such a horror Fischer could not imagine, not even in Hell.
Meanwhile, that game became the topic of discussion for every one, and subject to various guesses. And the organizers of the tournament and the heads of some contingents were informed that setting aside the forfeit would cause much more trouble, For, in such event, they would have to count on an eventual withdrawal from the tournament of the complete Soviet team. it was an ultimatum, like Fischer’s. The organizers found themselves between two fires and were left to choose the lesser evil, i.e. on the altar of the Book of Rules to place Bobby Fischer as their sacrifice.
On the eve of the game with Hort and wanting to know the decision of the Committee before the tournament entered upon its second half, Fischer again put the question of his game with Gipslis. It was too late as, meanwhile, a firm opinion had formed, and there was not enough time to argue out a new discussion. Fischer got a negative answer and, rather by instinctive re-action than reasoning, he left the tournament for the second time. He did not ‘appear for the game with Hort and, on his tournament score, appeared the second technical loss.
Majority opinion rates this stepping out by Fischer as a greater and less comprehensible mistake than his first. He had had enough time to think about it and could more correctly estimate the effect of his procedure. He still had the chance to win first place and also—what is most important— was sure of qualifying. This second forfeit with Hort had no in dependent meaning; it arose actually from the conflict over his game with Gipslis. But, with it, Fischer’s standing in the tournament became more difficult,
The organizers in a renewed attempt to save the tournament asked for intervention by the American Embassy, and the Embassy sent its secretary, Mrs. Johnson, to Sousse. But this attempt was fore doomed to fail, I don’t know if I myself, knowing the essence of the conflict, could have succeeded in persuading Fischer. And what could the Secretary of the Embassy do? She explained to him that he represents the USA and it would be in the interest of his country if he should return to the tournament eves’ at the sacrifice of his self-interest. Such grounds were not sufficient to convince Fischer, and he left again for Tunis,
Next day, there were rumors that Fischer would return to the tournament. What a lot of frivolity and child’s play! in this situation, the Committee of Organizers and the Commission of Arbitration consulted on November third and announced a decision to all the players that Fischer would be allowed to return only if he gave a written promise before the game with Larsen that he would not again step out of the tournament and if he agreed to the forfeits to Gipslis and Hort. One group of players, among them Reshevsky, was, not satisfied with such a solution and asked for an immediate exclusion, but the Committee was for this milder solution. Fischer answered that such action by himself was contrary to law and proposed to agree to the forfeits only if they conform to the FIDE rules.
The Committee took the stand that Fischer must be scratched from the list of participants if he failed to appear for the game with Larsen. This decision was communicated ten minutes before the time when Fischer (then in Tunis) could come to the game. It is clear that the American Champion was proclaimed “persona non grata” to the tournament.
What follows is most interesting. By phone from Tunis, Fischer declared his capitulation, saying that he accepted all conditions of the organizers, begging only that they postpone his game with Larsen till he had time to arrive. Actually, it was a shocking declaration. After all those roguish tricks and complications capitulation! It seems that Fischer realized all his opposition and thoughtless acts were out of place. He decided to obey and assume the responsibility and penalties for his attitude. It was a smart decision, and not easy for him. But Larsen, his former second during the Interzonal Tournament in Yugoslavia, didn’t consent to the necessary two-hour delay. Fischer’s clock was started and exactly at 8 P.M., the flag fell against Fischer, for his third technical loss.
It was the third time that Fischer failed to present himself for a game, and the arbiters pronounced by the book of rules his excommunication from the tournament and erased all his results in the tournament, since he had not completed half his games. As can be seen, Fischer did not know what to do till the very end and could not find his way out of a position caused by him personally. At the end he was ready to continue even with two zeros. Actually, he disqualified himself from the tournament. In the tournament, Fischer did not have a second. Over board, he needs none; he is excellently oriented and needs no help. But he does need a friend to give him advice and to restrain him from this imprudent of decision.
Sousse was a great success for the Danish grandmaster Bent Larsen. For the second time, he has won the FIDE Interzonal. At Amsterdam 1964, he shared first. This time, he was a clear first, a point and a half ahead o the nearest rival, He scored the most victories at Sousse, 13, and drew only five times, to rise above his three defeats. He plays a sharp, lively, sighting chess rife with ideas and devoid of compromises. Most people employ such an ungracious word as “overbearing” for his declarations. But measure them by the real values of his accomplishments, and criticism must he generous. Thus, before Havana, he declared courageously that he would win that tournament, and so he did. Perhaps, he thus rouses his morale and strength? After Sousse, he declared even more courageously that he is convinced that he personally shall meet World Champion Tigran Petrosian and become the next champion.
Few years after Larsen in an interview in NIC remembered: “What was annoying was that everything had become reduced to the question” Does Fischer play or not? For instance the day he returned for the second time and played with Reshevsky, that day the rest of the players could hardly play. When he finally got out of the tournament, which was to be expected soon or later, it came as a relief. Now we could play. There were terrible things. Reshevsky was very busy negotiating that if Fischer withdraw, his points would not be counted. I don’t know whether as an orthodox Jew he was allowed to conduct negotiations on a Saturday, but that’s what he did. Gligoric and I retired from the whole thing a bit. It was very disturbing to have a player leaving the tournament all the time. They had made a special program for Reshevsky with all these free days because he was a Jew. I asked Bobby at the opening ceremony, ‘What is this? You also want these free days? But you don’t respect them?’ And he said, ‘I don’t want to talk about it now.’ That was his mistake. He started talking two weeks later, when it was too late to change it. Then he made some very bad suggestions. He claimed that he couldn’t play five days in a row and suggested a change that implied that somebody else would have to do that. It was very difficult to understand him in these things. At that time he was already involved in this Armstrong’s Church of God. But he also had some Jewish ideas. It was a bit difficult to find out how he was religiously. There was also something strange with this Armstrong Church. Bobby lived far away from their centre in New York. Their centre was in Pasadena. But he was more strict than the others just to make sure he wouldn’t do anything wrong. For instance, on Saturdays he ate in his hotel room. That wasn’t necessary, but he wasn’t quite sure.’
In the book Fischer vs. the Russian, Gufeld and Vasjukov commented Fischer’s performance and story: “GUFELD: “At that moment Fischer behaved commendably. The fact is that if a participant drops out of a tournament having played less than half his games, his results are declared null and void. But if he has played half or more of his games, he is considered to have lost the remaining games.
In Sousse, owing to the weighted drawing of lots, Fischer had, in the first half of the tournament, had to play with the Soviet participants (which he managed very successfully). In the second half, he was to have played their main rivals, the Yugoslavs. If Fischer had withdrawn from the tournament after his game with Hort, all our rivals would have been awarded a possibly deci sive point in the struggle to qualify for the candidates’ stage of the championship. That was why Fischer had insisted before his game with Hort that he be told whether his game with Gipslis would take place. Fischer declared that if he played the game that day and then withdrew from the tournament, this would be dishonest toward his colleagues. But he would not continue the tournament with a minus.
VASYUKOV: “Once again a difficult situation arose at the tournament, and again no one knew whether Fischer would return to Sousse or whether this time he had left for good. The round began, and an hour later there were two minuses against Fischer’s name: for his forfeited games v Gipslis and Hort.
In round 14, Fischer’s opponent was to have been Larsen. But the panel of arbiters and the organizers of the tournament invited all the participants to an emergency meeting, at which they were notified of the following:
“In connection with the rumours concerning Mr. Fischer’s return on Saturday, November 4, after his second withdrawal from the Interzonal Tournament, the organizing committee and the arbitration commission had met on the evening of Friday, November 3, and reached two conclusions:
“First, that in accordance with the FIDE Rules (Par. 17), Mr. Fischer had forfeited the right to games with Gipslis and Hort. In the event of his failure to appear for a third game, it would be considered that he had ceased to be a tournament participant.
“Second, should Mr. Fischer return to the tournament, he must prior to the beginning of the round, on Saturday, November 4, confirm in writing his losses to Gipslis and Hort, and promise to complete the tournament in keeping with the schedule. Should Mr. Fischer decline to sign this undertaking, he would be expelled from the Interzonal Tournament.
The document was signed by the chairman of the committee and the chief arbiter.
In a statement at the meeting, Reshevsky demanded that Fischer be expelled from the tournament. This, however, was not supported by the other participants. They merely asked the arbiters not to count Fischer’s results should he return and then again withdraw from the tournament, irrespective of whether he had by then played more or less than 50 percent of his games. This point was of prime importance to the aspirants to the top six places.
I recall someone’s remark that Fischer was behaving like an abnormal person and Larsen’s words that, of course, he was abnormal, in a manner as if this was a self-evident fact.”
GUFELD: “Again there were negotiations, which were con ducted with Fischer even by the US Ambassador in Tunisia. Fischer was urged to continue the tournament even with two minuses. True, he still had to cover the 140 kilometers from the capital to Sousse.
“The United States Embassy provided its fastest car for the purpose, and a police helicopter assumed patrol duties over the highway to assure that Fischer’s car ran into no traffic snags. But… at 6 o’clock exactly there was a phone call from the capital, and after that the Sousse — Tunis ‘hot line’ was busy for an hour. All this time I was in the telephone booth, from which Fischer’s second, the Yugoslav journalist Bjelica con ducted the talks with the American. Bobby again demanded that the panel’s decision be reversed and he be given the chance to play the two games he had missed. Bjelica set off to discuss this with the arbiters, who reaffirmed their earlier decision. Now I tried to persuade Bobby to return, but he was inflexible…
Apparently, at this point Fischer began to realize subconsciously that he would not make it by the time limit fixed by the arbiters. Time was running out… At every new communication session his voice sounded less confident and plaintive notes were appearing in it. In another 10 minutes his clock was to have been started and if he then failed to make his first move within an hour, he would have lost by default.
“At 7 o’ clock F at last yielded… We heard the voice of a despairing person, who repeated several times over the telephone that he was prepared to continue the tournament with two minuses, but that Larsen should wail until he arrived. Everyone rushed to Bent, plea ding with him to agree. But the Dane replied: ‘No, the clock has been started. An hour later Fischer was again declared to have lost by default, and he dropped out of the running for the chess crown for three years.”
TAL: ‘I am quite certain that Fischer would have been among the winners of the tournament in Sousse. It is a great pity that such a chess player excluded himself from the world championship. All this looks rather odd…Of course, it was not an issue of Fischer’s religious beliefs; that is a person’s private affair. The crux of the problem was that some of the American grandmaster’s demands conflicted with common sense, never mind the tournament rules. In everyday life Fischer produces the impression of a rather nice lad. He is fanatically in love with chess, and is ready to play night and day. Certainly any one of us would regard it as fascinating to play a match with such a magnificent chess player.”
SMYSLOV: “By quitting the tournament in Sousse, Fischer dealt a blow above all to him self, Alas, Fischer the man challenged Fischer the chess- player, and the former won a victory that no one needed
The Candidates’ matches
Euwe commented in the Soviet Magazine 64
The right to play with World Champion is defined by the system of leaving the competition. If challenger loses one match he leaves. Such system is used in sport often. E.g. Wimbledon tennis competition. There is a difference: the drawing of lots is made such a way in tennis so that the strong will likely play to the final games closer. The program is made up so that the final will be of most interest. Weak players compete before the final mostly, but here unexpected things can happen. In chess it is quite different: starting number is decided by “simple” drawing of lots. Though if we would have tried to make strained final, the results of drawing of lots would only confirm it. Have a look: 1.Spassky 2.Tal 3. Larsen 4. Korchnoi 5. Geller 6. Gligoric 7. Portisch 8. Reshevsky. I’m sure here the true coordination of power is shown.
Further everything goes to the planned program. Forst round or quarterfinals: 1-5, 2-6, 3-7, 4-8. Defeated leave and remain: 1. Spassky 2. Tal 3. Larsen 4. Korchnoi. Semi-finals are the following: Spassky- Larsen, Tal- Korchnoi- according to the plan. It’s seen that the possibility of the final Spassky- Tal remains. We can’t decline the possibility of the strongest to meet beforehand. There’s always a chance, however, that the “big” final won’t be carried out in case if one of the leaders will refuse to play like it happened in Candidates tournaments before (Botvinnik’s refusal in 1965).
Everything described above is of great meaning in sport. What would be if the strongest players compete already at the first rounds? In chess it is different a bit. Power difference is much less. Nothing extraordinary would happen if the match Spassky- Tal was played. Where is the difference between the matches Spassky-Tal and Spassky- Geller? I believe that not sick Tal is stronger a bit than Geller, but sick Tal is weaker a bit…
Six Candidates’ matches were played already. Only the final Spassky -Korchnoi is left. I can tell a lot of interesting about quarter-finals but guess that readers know already enough from published material about it. Therefore I want to analyze the matches from the following point.
I remember tragic-comic situation happened at Hastings tournament in 1938/39. A player who just had lost the game and who had good chances to win, was sitting at the chess board and the pieces were in order which would lead to the victory. Everybody coming by, on his demand, should make a move as if “his opponent”- and to every move the player exclaimed “It was how I should have put it”.
Victor Korchnoi- Samuel Reshevsky.
Starting form the 1st game Reshevsky was the leader .Till the 17th move Korchnoi thought the game to be lost. But Reshevsky then relaxed and didn’t make problems- Korchnoi could have made draw. Further Korchnoi did not let Reshevsky to lead and was great in the 4th, 6th games. Still we cannot but admire Reshevsky who could get right to take part in the candidates match at the age of 60.
Amsterdam, V, 1968
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | Total | |
| Reshevsky S | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | = | 2.5 |
| Korchnoi V | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | = | 5.5 |
Lajos Portisch- Bent Larsen.
It seemed that Larsen had to win the match twice: at the 3rd and then at the 10th games though everything was decided by the 9th game- 4:4. Portisch gained a lot of advantages and made obvious winning moves. He did not suffer time trouble. Haven’t used evident advantages two or three times- the game was sure to be lost. But it was too late to change anything. Draw was inevitable. In the 10th game Portisch could not defend and lost without any struggle. The match was uncertain till the end, and to rate either rival better would be unfounded. Portisch started unfortunately, yet could have won. It was a fight of equals and fortune decided.
Porec, V, 1968
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | Total | |
| Portisch L | = | 0 | 0 | 1 | = | = | 1 | = | = | 0 | 4.5 |
| Larsen B | = | 1 | 1 | 0 | = | = | 0 | = | = | 1 | 5.5 |
Boris Spassky – Efraim Geller.
The situation seemed to be hopeless for Tal after five games- he was 1 point behind and was to play Whites twice, and Blacks- three times. Gligoric was simply waiting for Tal to lose. He waited- and this was wrong tactic. He thought he did not need to win anymore, he needed not to lose. In the 2nd game Gligoric had all chances to win but did not use them. And only, in the 6th game when Tal showed his great talent Gligoric remembered the 2nd game. In the 7th game Gligoric did not pay attention to the chance to make a draw- and the fight was decided.
Sukhumi, VI, 1968
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | Total | |
| Geller E | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | = | 2.5 |
| Spassky B | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | = | 5.5 |
Tal- Gligoric, Belgrade, IV-V, 1968.
The situation seemed to be hopeless for Tal after five games- he was one point behind and was to play Whites twice and Blacks- three times. Gligoric was simply waiting for Tal to lose. He waited- and this was wrong tactic. He thought he did not need to win anymore, he needed not to lose. In the 2nd game Gligoric had all chances to win but did not use them. And only, in the 6th game when Tal showed his great talent Gligoric remembered the 2nd game. In the 7th game Gligoric did not pay attention to the chance to make a draw- and the fight was decided. In game 9, Gligoric committee small inexactitudes, then unfortunately conceived the idea of playing in the style of Tal. He sacrificed an Exchange, and the game and the match were lost.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | Total | |
| Tal M | 0 | = | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | = | 1 | 5.5 |
| Gligoric S | 1 | = | = | = | = | 0 | 0 | = | 0 | 3.5 |
Semifinal matches
The clash between the two favorites Spassky and Larsen started disastrously for the Nordic player. Despite 3 points down after three rounds, Larsen showed a fantastic courage by playing all remaining game for victory but finally, Spassky won somehow quite easily. The match between Tal and Korchnoi was even more dramatic. Tal, never played successfully against Korchnoi in the past and once again he started this match with two losses when in the 10th game he decides to play for ‘all or nothing’….and 61 moves later the game was draw with a much better position for Korchnoi.
Mihail Tal- Viktor Korchnoi
As was generally expected, Mikhail Tal lost his semifinal duel of the Candidates’ Matches to Victor Korchnoi. But he lost it in such an unexpected way that anyone going over these games, even superficially, would naturally conclude that Korchnoi’s victory was a Pyrrhic one. The plain truth is that Tal could have and should have won this duel; the final verdict, therefore, must be that the match was lost by Tal rather than won by Korchnoi.
The qualification “this particular duel” contains the secret; Tal’s individual score against Korchnoi to date has been so disastrous that most people accepted the explanation that this was one of those strange cases where the psychological factor played a bigger role than chess ability. To be exact, Korchnoi was leading Tal, before this match, by a score of nine to one in individual encounters in various tournaments.
Tal himself tried to deny the role of any psychological factors, stressing that the reasons which prevented him from exploiting his advantages had nothing to do with his sad memories, but they were the result of the great tension felt by both opponents.
The seventh game started with Tal’s supporters full of new hope, which were almost fulfilled, but for their hero’s inadequate handling of a very promising, perhaps won, endgame. Obviously shaken by his failure in the previous game and probably a little scared of Tal’s eventual sacrificial orgy, Korchnoi decided right from the start to go into an inferior endgame. This was a risk, and as we saw, a very well-calculated risk. For it had already been observed that it was precisely in the endgame that Tal was not equal to the task. When the final analysis of this match is made, it will certainly be established that Tal lost this duel because he lost his way in some very promising endgames. Anyway, this was the case in the seventh game — the last one in which Tal had a really good chance to turn the tables and provide a psychological shock for his opponent. For the eighth game, with Tal playing Black, was uneventful, and the ninth was one of those cases in which a player burning with the desire to play for a win at any price reached a position right after the opening which unfortunately was not to his taste.
It was almost pathetic to see Tal make a peace offer as early as the 22nd move and to see his opponent with the audacity to decline the offer! Old Grandmaster Flohr commented that this draw offer was Tal’s best move in the game, which could give you an idea of what kind of position the “devil from Riga” was in. Still, the issue was not resolved because the ninth game ended finally in a draw and Tal got another try to even the score.
But it was a try from a different position: not only was he a point behind but he had to do it with the Black pieces. So Tal chose the sharpest opening at his disposal, the Dutch Defense. He sacrificed a pawn and went in for an all-out attack. At one stage it looked as though he might succeed. But something was missing somewhere and when adjournment came, the betting was that Korchnoi would hold his own. Twenty more moves were played thereafter but with no effect. The game was drawn and so Victor became the victor by the closest possible score: 5½-4½.
Moscow, VI-VII, 1968.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | Total | |
| Tal M | = | = | = | 0 | 0 | 1 | = | = | = | = | 4.5 |
| Korchnoi V | = | = | = | 1 | 1 | 0 | = | = | = | = | 5.5 |
Petrosian interviewed just after the match said: “The two Grandmasters committed surprisingly many very big blunders,” Petrosian went on, “and especially Tal excelled in that department. How he didn’t win the third game, how he lost the fifth so carelessly, and how with an excellent position in the tenth game he made a suicidal move with his h-pawn — all this will remain a mystery to me. To my mind Korchnoi also played below his strength, but he deserved the victory because he erred less.”
Spassky- Larsen, Malmö, VII, 1968.
Spassky was not too happy with the chose of the venue of the match: Sweden was more close to Denmark than Russia he said. Too much was expected of Larsen. After winner the Interzonal in 1967 and the Chess Oscar of the best player of the year, super-optimistic he didn’t hesitate to prognoses a great and violent fight from which he could emerge as the winner. Nonetheless, Spassky did not embark upon this match with Larsen easily and fearlessly.
Spassky took an early lead after winning the first game with great technique. Better in the second game Larsen took inconsiderable risks and collapsed at once leaving Spassky with a second point. Thanks to Larsen’s error Spassky scored the third point. In the fourth, Spassky overlooked an easy win in a mating attack. Larsen won the fifth and his only game showing an excellent technical play. In the sixth, after a fine sacrifice, Larsen took the upper hand but could not break the heroic defense of Spassky. In the seventh Larsen blundered away a Pawn and visibly without fighting spirit, let Spassky taken the full control of the game and the point. Game eight was played very quickly. It was clear that Larsen understood long before that this match was over.
After the match, Spassky concluded: “I have the impression that Larsen conducted this match not like a professional but rather like a good amateur. I mean, he was stale from too many tournaments. No one can support such a tempo. As for myself, I abstained from all chess activity before the match. In a match of this sort, a man must put everything of himself into the effort. My impression is that Larsen is unquestionably greater as a tournament fighter than a match opponent….”
Q: What happened to Larsen?
A: Nothing special! In chess it is always like this when one wins, the other loses. Why did he lose in that way? That is easier to answer. I think he did not develop the skill to keep the blow as in boxing, for example, after his successful performances in the last tourneys. If in the middle of the contest he was in a mood, at the end he was absolutely quiet. And I can not but mention that during my stay in Sweden I was dealing with a correct, self-controlled and nice partner.
Q: What atmosphere the match was held in?
A: The atmosphere was good. My opponent had a lot of fans, of course. But the Swedes as well as the Dutch behaved themselves very calmly and strained as true Northern people.
Q: What are your plans for future?
A: I will play versus Korchnoi. We know each other for a long time in life and at the board. I do not count our encounters and do not want to make any prognoses. I prefer to read and listen to the comments of the journalists and my rivals.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | Total | |
| Spassky B | 1 | 1 | 1 | = | 0 | = | 1 | = | 5.5 |
| Larsen B | 0 | 0 | 0 | = | 1 | = | 0 | = | 2.5 |
Final match: Spassky-Korchnoi, Kiev, IX, 1968. (Based on the note by Trifunovic in CR)
Game 1
The first game was a quick draw. It hardly left the opening and Korchnoi has quickly obtained a draw, as Spassky’s previous opponents, Geller and Larsen could not.
Game 2
Here Korchnoi had White and, on the well-known match motto: “with Black, draw, with White, win,” he likely had programmed a win. And the truth of the presumption is indicated in the sharpness with which be contested the opening. Moves like 7. g4 and 16. 0—0-0 are not at all usual in the Queen’s Gambit Declined and especially not in such an important meeting and with such a great opponent. Spassky did not find the right way in the opening and against his opponent’s sharp play. So he emerged from the opening with an inferior and passive position. And Korchnoi had excellent prospects. But he did not find the right plan of play, and Spassky, putting up a good defense in a difficult position, began to slip away like an eel. Korchnoi put out all his effort and lost time looking to use his advantage, which meanwhile became meaningless. He felt he must fulfill his program at any price and fell into great time pressure when it would be normal to discard all notions of winning and play to hold the balance. But it was already too late by the time he strove thus. Spassky knows how to take advantage of time pressure from lessons which Korchnoi had given years before. So Spassky suddenly went onto the counter attack, like a tiger. And the effect was surprising. Korchnoi’s pieces flew from the board so that Spassky could hardly pick them all up by using both hands. All went in some seconds.
This defeat affected Korchnoi like a physical shock. Long after the game, he could not understand what happened, or how. And there was born the worm which bit into his play all the rest of the match. Spassky had found his way excellently in defending and evinced the feeling for the right moment for the counter attack.
Game 3
Korchnoi met the Closed Variation of the Sicilian, which had been so destructive for Geller and Larsen, with an old-fashioned system in which Black immediately prepares play in the center with …e6 and d5. And he equalized quickly and easily. Manifestly, Korchnoi had prepared well to withstand Spassky’s terrific weapon. For a moment, Spassky played with an “easy hand,” and Korchnoi obtained a dangerous initiative. But he was unable to break through Spas- sky’s extraordinary and exact defense. Later analyses have shown that Korchnoi could have played better, but nowhere have they shown that he could have won.
Game 4
Korchnoi had White again in the fourth game. Everyone expects him again to force the objectively “small” chance (for him so “big” a one) and reach a sharp and cruel fight. And so it happened. Korchnoi played an English Opening In a very strange and till now unforeseen manner. He permitted his opponent to gain an advantage in the center and on the Kingside while he pushed Pawns to obtain the initiative on the Queenside. Later, he had no choice but to castle Queenside, with a very unsafe for his King. It is easy to understand that he should strive to equalize the match score as soon as possible; the way in which he went at it was bad. For he exposed himself and gave greater chances to his opponent. And Spassky is not an opponent to neglect such opportunities. At the right moment, Spassky checked all Korchnoi’s Queenside efforts with a fine positional sacrifice of the Exchange and brought Korchnoi into a completely passive position in which he could only wait to see how Spassky would strike the final blow. That, however, took time and expended emotion, and suddenly Spassky committed a gross oversight by which Korchnoi could have turned the game in his favor. But it happened in time pressure, and neither player remarked the possibility. Spassky retained his advantage to adjournment and, afterward of course by analysis, conducted the final part of his attack very exactly and efficiently.
Game 5
Here again stepped onto the scene the Closed Sicilian. And Korchnoi attained equality even more quickly and easily than in Game 3. And, on one small moment of incautiousness by Spas sky, Korchnoi gained a positional advantage and the initiative. But, as in the previous games, Spassky’s extraordinary defensive ability came to expression. He sensed immediately that he was in danger and began to play only the best defensive moves. There is no point in the game thenceforth in which he could have been found to play better. Nor was Korchnoi at fault; he also played very well. Analyses have shown that he could have posed a more difficult problem or two but at no point could he have won. It is extremely difficult to defeat a player like Spassky who sees so much on the defense. So it was again that frequent picture in this match: Korchnoi had the initiative and attack but he could not break Spassky’s resistance, and the game ended drawn.
It is interesting to note that Korchnoi as Black had easily equalized vs. 1. e4 or even attained an advantage. But, as White, he lost both times. Of course, this situation is not normal and requires explanation. Who can draw with Black must be even more capable of drawing with White! But this strange phenomenon may even help to explain Korchnoi’s loss of the match: his exaggerated wish to win with White was the principal reason for his defeat. He ought to have been able to play the White pieces as elastically and moderately as he did the Black. And his great mistake was to force himself and the position thus incurring more risk than was prudent. Spassky’s extraordinary ability to employ the assistance of time pressure, moreover, capped what was begun by Korchnoi’s imprudence.
Game 6
Here finally came the sun on Korchnoi’s door. He won Game 6 and so diminished Spassky’s lead to a minimum. His win, however, was a poor and casual one which could not satisfy a player like Korchnoi. He was completely outplayed and on the way to a third defeat in what was the best game that Spassky played in the match. But Spassky lost as overlooked a quite simple and readily perceived sacrifice of a Queen which left Korchnoi two Pawns up. Even then Spassky likely had chances of saving the game but missed them in time pressure.
Following this win by Korchnoi and the consequent close score, many observers thought that the fight would be tight and uncertain again. But the impression was momentary and superficial; for Korchnoi was broken physically and nervously and no longer in shape to withstand the pressures imposed by his opponent.
Game 7
In the seventh game, Spassky suddenly and sharply changed his tactics in the opening. He understood at last that Korchnoi was brilliantly pre pared to fight the Spassky system with 1.e4 and thus impregnable. So Spassky turned to 1.d4, most likely surprising Korchnoi. For the latter chose his defense poorly. It is known that the King’s Indian doesn’t comport with Korchnoi’ s style: he has had very unpleasant experiences with that defense. Apparently, his choice was motivated again by an exaggerated wish to win and so equalize the score immediately. He may also have hoped that Spassky would be depressed by his preceding loss and so will play moderately. But lie soon perceived he had backed the wrong horse. Spassky replied very energetically with the Saemisch Attack, clearly ambitious to win. And Korchnoi lost himself in the forest of the variations, clearly no native in this country. So Spassky profited sharply by Korchnoi’s weak play even to sacrificing his Queen for a mate. And thus Spassky again led by two points. With only five games to the end of the match, no one except perhaps Korchnoi had doubts as to the outcome now.
Game 8
Korchnoi found chances; however, Spassky began with a suspicious Pawn action on the Queenside because of which Korchnoi could have obtained very active and promising play. But Korchnoi neglected to punish Spassky for his experiment. Later, too, he missed defensive possibilities, continuing passively and without ideas very unlike the usual Korchnoi. So it was not difficult for Spassky to bring his depressed opponent to a passive and inferior position, then decide the game with a mating attack. With the score at 5% to 2%, the match became hopeless for Korchnoi: in the four remaining games, Spassky needed but one more point.
Game 9
Korchnoi continued to fight as best he could, but clearly without his true strength and ability. He again outplayed Spassky in Game 9 winning an Exchange for a Pawn, forcing Spassky to play with caution. But Spassky’s ingenious defense could not be overcome, not by Korchnoi and likely not anyway.
Game 10
Korchnoi tried his last chance only again to see all his hopes smashed against Spassky’s exact defense. And he was the first to congratulate Spassky on his victory as he offered a draw on move 31.
As Spassky then had 6½ points, no further games were necessary.
Korchnoi resumed the match in few sentence: “Not once I succeeded in penetrating my opponent defense. The only victory in the 6th game is more Spassky doing that mine. Spassky won the match because I had the initiative in many games but I didn’t know how to break his defensive fortress.”
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | Total | ||
| Spassky B | = | 1 | = | 1 | = | 0 | 1 | 1 | = | = | 6.5 | |
| Korchnoi V | = | 0 | = | 0 | = | 1 | 0 | 0 | = | = | 3.5 |
It was not easy to emerge as the winner from matches with such strong players as Korchnoi, Tal, Geller, Gligoric, Larsen, Portisch, and Reshevsky. And, in his matches with Geller, Larsen, and Korchnoi, Spassky played 26 games and scored phenomenally, winning 11, drawing 13 and losing only two. Put another way, he led by three games, with two to go, in each match!
Asked when he was persuaded that he would win the match with Korchnoi, Spassky gave the following very characteristic answer:
“I had enough self-confidence and was very well disposed before the match. The third game, however, when I found that Korchnoi could not damage me when he had an excellent position, was a special morale booster.”
Asked also how he had estimated his rival’s play, he became almost as sibylline as the school of Pythia:
“Generally speaking, I tranquilized myself after I became acquainted with his previous games.”
Korchnoi’s replies were clearer and more direct and so more interesting:
“It appeared clear that I was absolutely unprepared for the fight with Spassky, and my defeat is completely merited. Really, I did not succeed in a single game. Sixth game? It could have been numbered among the best played games of the last ten years if Spassky had not erred in a decisive moment. I am sorry that he did not win that game.”
And some other responses:
Q: What is Spassky’s strength?
A: Alas, I cannot answer that!
Q: When did you perceive that the match was lost for you?
A: When I lost and didn’t win the eighth game!
Q: Whom do you consider the strongest player in the world?
A: Of course, Spassky!
Q: What do you expect in the match between Petrosian and Spassky?
A: I am absolutely convinced that Spas sky will win.
Q: What in your opinion is the most objective form of competition for the world chess championship?
A: The system of matches! Superiority must be proved in meetings “tete a tete” and without help from the flanks.
Q: Do you wish to meet Spassky again?
A: It is my fantasy!
Former world champion Mikhail Botvinnik gave to the readers of Politika Belgrade newspaper a very interesting interview:
“Boris Spassky drew near to his greatest strength. He admits only that which is clear and precise and doesn’t cloud his play with fantasies. The constancy of his successes in the matches impressed me. Lasker alone ever played such a series of victorious matches, Spassky has played seven matches in the last three years and won six and lost only one with a minimal result.”
To the question, “Do you think Spassky can win from Petrosian?” Botvinnik replied:
“Petrosian himself can answer this question. He is now in bad form. But there is a half-year before that match and, if he begins to prepare appropriately, the outcome of the match is very difficult to foretell, though it will be much more difficult for the world champion than in 1966. Spassky is older and wiser by three years and his chess strength has incredibly increased.”
Before the start of the final match, T. Petrosian gave an interview to the Novosti Press Agency:
”In my opinion, both Spassky and Korchnoi are at the present time playing better than Fischer whom I am inclined to place immediately behind them, that is in front of Larsen and Tal. It sometimes seems to me that Fischer did not appear for the start of the Amsterdam Interzonal Tournament in 1964 and withdrew from the event in Sousse because he is afraid of losing a match against one of the very strongest candidates. For then the halo of invincibility surrounding ‘Bobby the Genius’ would fade noticeably and the practical American could no longer dictate correspondingly high financial conditions to those tournament organizers who would like to see him on the list of participant’
About the preparation? As far back as the time of the matches between Alekhine and Euwe, the seconds began to plays not unimportant role in deciding the World Championship. And it is by no means just one helper who takes part in the preparations In this or that form. Often the names of such assistants are kept secret. And there is the reason for that for names mean views, and they influence the approach the future contender takes to the struggle.
It also works the other way, as in problems of logic where the proof is worked out backward. By observing the method of play and the ideas which your opponent demonstrates over the board it is possible to guess who is helping him. Even if this is not so useful, it is interesting nevertheless. Let’s take an example from the now distant year of 1966. Spassky’s adherence at the end of the match to systems with an early thrust, 1…b5 4 was enough to give away’ Smyslov’s adherence, who was certainly not counted among the challenger’s official seconds.
Oh, yes, you’re interested in my preparations. As always, I prepared for the match with my old chess friends—grandmasters Isaac Boleslavsky and Alexei Suetin. In the company also of grandmaster Semyon Furman, we all spent the time pretty well at the Krasnaya Pakhra’ Holiday Home near Moscow (before moving on to my favorite Sukhanovo). You probably know that in his time Alekhine complained about opponents who by their poor play prevented him from creating true works of art. So I am very anxious that Spassky should not find himself in such an unenviable situation and that he should have a worthy co-author –
I also devoted not a little time to physical preparation. So far—touch wood—l cannot complain about my health. All the same. in this most important component fly possibilities, I must admit, are closer to those if not of Tal then at least of Korchnoi than those of Botvinnik, Smyslov, or my future rival.”
And Spassky talked about his life in Europe Echecs:
Despite his 31 years, he is sincere when he says he feels like a fish in an aquarium, open to all eyes yet still a prisoner. As the saying goes, glory has its drawbacks. When asked for his main interest in life, he replied:
To make my dreams come true, to be as tangible as a stone on the road, as…
Q: But you’re talking in generalities! Doesn’t your dream involve the chess crown?”
A: No it involves spectacles on my nose and big books on my arms! I call my dream, Philosophy. I do think of winning. I know it requires a lot of work, which I’ll do, but …
Q: I recall that the first time your picture was published, one paper had the heading: Boris Spassky, future grandmaster?
A: That may be.
Q: But what if there hadn’t been this picture, and many others, or the rapid succession from candidate to master to grandmaster, if there hadn’t been any chess, what would have become of Boris Spassky?
A: Well, he wouldn’t have made a bad engineer … meticulous, expert in his specialty
Q: Say, how about grandmaster Spassky playing against engineer Spassky?
A: Agreed! And I’ll give him odds of a Queen!
Do you know, continues the grandmaster, if I hadn’t succeeded at chess, I’d be a simple engineer, dressed in the latest style, sporting a little beard, smoking a pipe and wearing blue jeans. I would go in far athletics, perhaps as a jumper or sprinter. I’m interested in genetics, literature, philosophical discussions. I dance fairly well and get along with women. I like my work – without this, it’s impossible to talk of the well—being or development of a person, for a man’s work must give him the satisfaction he has a right to expect.
Q: Who or what is your ideal?
A: I’m fascinated by exceptional people — Alexander, Jean Gabin, Einstein, Brumel
Q: And in chess circles?
A: Alekhine, Tal and Fischer.
Q: Are you making any special preparations for the coming match?”
A: Yes, I practice yoga; I’ve learned to hold my breath and to stand on my head. Boy, will Petrosian be astounded!”
